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Purpose 
Different length of collaboration with colleagues at work is a central feature of modern working life, and even 
more so in a work environment that is increasingly project focused and knowledge-intensive. Despite its practical 
importance there is little research on how the perceived costs and benefits in an information-sharing dilemma 
might change depending on collaboration length. Based on a social dilemma framework it is hypothesised that 
anticipated length of collaboration time will significantly influence the motivation to collaborate.  
 
Design 
An experimental scenario study (N=87) compared the willingness to work collaboratively, share information and 
help the partner in a long-term (two academic terms) vs. a short-term (one week) condition.  
 
Findings 
At first somewhat counterintuitively, participants were more helpful in the short-term, and insisted more on 
equality and disengaged more from a defecting partner - but not the project - in the long-term condition. People 
appear to focus more on the immediate task in short-term collaborations ― even at cost ― because the outcome 
is more important than the relationship, and more on setting norms for equality and reciprocity in long-term 
collaborations to avoid future exploitation. 
  
2 
 
Practical implications 
The findings help understanding the motivation and the partner and task perception under different time 
conditions and support managing teams in an increasingly project-oriented work environment with changing 
partners and varying time frames.  
 
Originality 
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper investigating the influence of anticipated collaboration time in 
information-sharing dilemmas. 
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Abstract 
Purpose 
Different length of collaboration with colleagues at work is a central feature of modern 
working life, and even more so in a work environment that is increasingly project focused 
and knowledge-intensive. Despite its practical importance there is little research on how the 
perceived costs and benefits in an information-sharing dilemma might change depending on 
collaboration length. Based on a social dilemma framework it is hypothesised that anticipated 
length of collaboration time will significantly influence the motivation to collaborate.  
Design 
An experimental scenario study (N=87) compared the willingness to work collaboratively, 
share information and help the partner in a long-term (two academic terms) vs. a short-term 
(one week) condition.  
Findings 
At first somewhat counterintuitively, participants were more helpful in the short-term, and 
insisted more on equality and disengaged more from a defecting partner - but not the project - 
in the long-term condition. People appear to focus more on the immediate task in short-term 
collaborations ― even at cost ― because the outcome is more important than the 
relationship, and more on setting norms for equality and reciprocity in long-term 
collaborations to avoid future exploitation. 
Practical implications 
The findings help understanding the motivation and the partner and task perception under 
different time conditions and support managing teams in an increasingly project-oriented 
work environment with changing partners and varying time frames.  
Originality 
  
4 
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper investigating the influence of anticipated 
collaboration time in information-sharing dilemmas. 
 
Keywords: time, information-sharing, cooperation, social dilemma, reciprocity, helping, work 
dyads 
 
Article classification: Research paper 
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Collaboration Time Influences Information-Sharing at Work 
Time is absolutely fundamental to human existence. It structures everyday actions, 
and fundamentally shapes social interactions with others, both anticipated and present, as 
well as the perception of past interactions. In Roe’s words: “…no form of behaviour could 
possibly [be] defined without reference to time” (2008, p. 37). Every individual and every 
group acts in the light of its own specific history and even future events have an impact on 
present behaviour (Nuttin, 1985). Over time, teams and dyads develop norms, experience 
events that shape their structure and identity, and influence and are influenced by the 
behaviour and attitudes of their members. Entire organisations are shaped by the life span of 
collaborations, both in face-to-face and virtual contexts (Saunders & Ahuja, 2006, Bakker & 
Knoben, 2015). Despite its importance, the effects of time on work collaborations have been 
neglected in past research (Blount, 2004; Gersick, 1988; McGrath, 1991; Mohammed, 
Hamilton & Lim, 2009).  
This paper addresses an important gap in previous studies by focussing on the 
anticipation of collaboration time and its influence on information-sharing in dyadic 
interactions. It is hypothesized that the mere anticipation of shorter or longer collaborations 
already casts a ‘shadow of the future’ on how collaboration partners and the costs and 
benefits of information-sharing are perceived and hence lays the ground for all future 
interactions. Dyads are the smallest organisational units for information-sharing and central 
to interactions both within teams and the wider organisation. Information has become one of 
the central organisational assets in a knowledge-intensive economy, but is still an under-
research topic in the management of teams. A social dilemma framework is proposed to study 
how the anticipated collaboration time might affect the attitude towards collaborating, sharing 
information and helping a collaboration partner.  
Time and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas 
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Social dilemmas are, generally speaking, situations where there is a (potential) 
conflict between individual and collective interests. In Axelrod’s famous prisoner’s dilemma 
game study (1984), he identified three requirements for cooperation, one being an on-going 
relationship. According to Axelrod, “[t]he future can therefore cast a shadow back upon the 
present and thereby affect the current strategic situation” (1984, p. 12). Thus, in one-shot 
prisoner’s dilemma games cooperation was only rarely observed (Orbell & Dawes, 1993; 
Palfrey & Rosenthal, 1994). A more recent review of step-level and continuous public good 
games, however, found mixed effects (Abele, Stasser & Chartier, 2010) with a decrease of 
cooperation in continuous games over time (Ledyard, 1995), and both an increase in 
cooperation (Bagnoli & McKee, 1991) as well as a decrease over time (Suleiman & 
Rapoport, 1992) in step-level games. Outside the laboratory, there is evidence that 
cooperation increases if there is a greater probability of a continuing relationship (Bó, 2005; 
Murnighan & Roth, 1983). For instance, Heide and Miner (1992) found supporting evidence 
for a positive relation between the duration of interactions and the level of cooperation in a 
survey study among 136 industrial buyers and sellers. A study using a monetary social 
dilemma task found that anticipated future interactions increased cooperativeness, and 
significantly more so for participants with an individualistic rather than a prosocial 
orientation (Van Lange, Klapwijk & Van Munster, 2011). 
The rationale behind this type of conditional cooperative behaviour is that people fear 
to lose the cooperation of their partner in the future if they defect in the present. A joint future 
offers the possibility to reward or sanction others’ behaviour and to build up one’s reputation 
as a cooperation partner. Thus, the threat of future retaliation affects decisions in the present 
and deters players from defecting. Formal mathematical analyses support this (Fudenberg & 
Maskin, 1990; Radner, 1986), and simulations with multi-trial dilemmas reveal that “tit-for-
tat” captures participants’ behaviour best (Axelrod, 1984). 
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Although repeated dilemma games are thought to model real-world situations such as 
continued exchange in long-term work relationships, they lack the multidimensionality of real 
cooperation because they tend to only consider monetary contributions. Cooperation, 
however, has multiple facets such as the willingness to share problem-solving strategies or 
exchange information (Heide & Miner, 1992). In fact, the extent to which knowledge is 
effectively exchanged is important for the successful functioning of teams as well as 
organisations. In addition, real-world interactions go beyond the mere distinction of defection 
vs. cooperation but include behaviours such as helping others, sharing information or 
compensating for less experienced partners. A recent postulate in social dilemma research 
thus has been “to incorporate features of the real-world dilemma into the game” (Abele et al., 
2010, p. 397).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Length of Collaboration Time 
Several terminologies have been used in previous research to capture the effects of 
time on attitudes and behaviour. “Time perspective” was first proposed by Nuttin (1985) to 
describe the cognitive representation of a sequence of events, for example, repeated 
interaction or future collaboration, as opposed to the term “time perception” which describes 
the subjective perception of time such as duration. Time perspective matters as “future […] 
events have an impact on present behaviour to the extent that they are actually present on the 
cognitive level of behavioural functioning” (Nuttin, 1985, p. 54). In this respect, time 
perspective differs from the understanding of time in the social dilemma studies reviewed 
above where usually a single interaction (a so-called one-shot) vs. repeated interactions are 
compared within one laboratory session. Time perspective, in contrast, relates to the temporal 
aspects of collaborations and their impact on attitudes and behaviour and comes closest to the 
scope of this study about the effects of anticipated collaboration time.  
Previous studies found that time perspective can impact on decision-making and 
behaviour, for instance, that a future time perspective can help a person to “transcend 
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[immediate] stimulus forces” (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999, p. 1272), and to delay gratification. 
A study on attitude-behaviour consistency showed that consistency increased if a distant-
future (long-term) time perspective was present as compared to only a near future (short-
term) time perspective for attitudes and behaviours regarding environmental protection and 
saving money (Rabinovich, Morton & Postmes, 2010). Another study on creative project 
teams found that teams with a relatively shorter time perspective focused more on the 
immediate present and task completion rather than on task elaboration compared to teams 
with a longer time perspective (Bakker, Boros, Kenis & Oerlemans, 2013). 
The Shadow of the Future in Information-Sharing Dilemmas 
This paper aims to extend existing research by using a social dilemma framework to 
understand how the anticipation of short vs. long-term collaboration affects the perception of 
costs and benefits in an information-sharing dilemma. The study used a typical student task 
scenario for dyads
1
 that included writing a term paper and making a presentation (Moser & 
Wodzicki, 2007) and represents an information-sharing dilemma that is mapped closely to 
real world experiences of the student participants. It included central cooperation behaviours 
like help-seeking with high costs for the co-operator and used time frames that mirrored 
realistic life spans of typical project work (one week vs. two academic terms). Most previous 
social dilemma research investigated only one-shot vs. repeated interactions within one lab-
session which tends to give the interaction a “game character” that is quite different from 
actual collaborations in a work context. The lab studies have an inherent bias towards a short-
term time perspective even in repeated games because the experiment takes place within a 
limited time on the same day. Lastly, the study used an information-sharing dilemma instead 
of monetary contributions because information is a central ‘currency’ in a knowledge-
                                                 
1
 In line with a long-standing tradition in social psychology dyads are understood as simple groups as they are 
the smallest possible unit where interaction between individuals occurs (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Dyads are 
central units of interaction at work, often as part of larger groups.  
  
9 
intensive work environment but still under-researched (Moser, 2009; Steinel, Utz & Koning, 
2010).  
Sharing information is a classic public goods dilemma (Dawes, 1980). From a 
collective perspective, it is highly desirable that individuals share task-relevant information 
with collaborators. However, from an individual perspective it is ambiguous as it can entail 
status gains (as expert or team player) and public rewards (Ardichvili, Page, & Wentling, 
2003; Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002), but there are also significant costs involved in acquiring 
knowledge. And, once the information is shared, it can be used by anyone regardless of 
whether they contributed to acquiring the knowledge or not. Thus, individual contributions 
might get lost in the overall group performance and this can increase the risk of free-
riders―individuals who profit from the information but do not make any efforts to provide 
information themselves. Thus, sharing information poses a social dilemma between 
individual and collective interests, which can undermine effective information-sharing 
(Connolly, Thorn, & Heminger, 1992; Cress & Kimmerle, 2007; De Cremer & Bakker, 2003; 
Moser & Wodzicki, 2007; Sanna, Parks, & Chang, 2003; Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 
2004). Based on previous research, it is hypothesized that the anticipation of long vs. short-
term collaboration times has significant effects on the willingness to cooperate: 
Norms of equality and reciprocity: Participants are more likely to insist on equal 
contributions if the partner defects in the long-term compared to the short-term condition 
(H1a). The reasoning behind this is that they want to set a norm of equality and reciprocity in 
long-term relationships to avoid being exploited in the future, which could be very costly. At 
the same time they want to stay cooperative themselves to ensure the long-term cooperation 
of their partner. This may go as far as compensating for a defecting partner and or showing at 
least conditional cooperation (H1b). There is less danger of exploitation in short-term 
relationships, simply because there is less opportunity to free-ride, but also to retaliate if the 
partner is uncooperative, so norm setting is expected to be less important. 
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Helping the partner: Every well-functioning group or organisation depends on the 
helpfulness of its members, for instance to integrate newcomers. This presents a dilemma 
situation with very high costs. Not only has the helper more experience and knowledge to 
which the other contributed nothing, but the helping itself also requires time and effort. It is 
hypothesized that participants are more likely to help in the short-term and more likely to 
punish a help-seeking partner in a long-term relationship through withholding help (H2). The 
reasoning behind this is that in short-term relationships helping and the costs associated with 
it are limited investments. In the interest of getting the task done, people may agree to help 
because in the short-term, the outcome (e.g., the grade received) is more important than the 
additional investment. In the long-term condition, a lower willingness to help is expected 
because people do not want to appear easily exploitable, but also because it is realistic for the 
partner to learn and acquire expertise. Participants are therefore more likely to focus on the 
equality in the exchange relationship and less on the immediate outcome. 
Defecting and free-riding: Participants are expected to be more likely to take 
advantage of a cooperative and helpful partner in the short-term than in the long-term 
condition (H3). The reasoning behind this is that in the short-term condition there is little 
time to get the task done (so all contributions are welcome), but also little opportunity for 
retaliation. In the long-term condition there is the risk of losing the partner’s cooperation and 
being punished for free-riding, but there is also enough time to go down the ‘lonely wolf’ 
route. 
Social value orientation: Social value orientations (SVO) are usually defined as 
stable preferences for certain patterns of outcomes for oneself and others (Van Lange et al, 
2013). The two main types of SVO are prosocials who want to maximize joint outcomes or 
achieve equal outcomes, and proselfs who focus on self-interest goals or a relative advantage 
over others and expect a similar behaviour of their interaction partners. Prosocials are 
consistently more cooperative than proselfs. Proselfs, on the contrary, are more likely to 
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make self-benefit choices and tend to cooperate only if they are given external incentives 
(Bogaert et al., 2008) or if their group identity is made salient (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 
2002). A long-term time perspective might act as such an incentive for cooperative choices, 
because anticipated future interactions offer the possibility of sanctioning or rewarding 
current behaviour. A long-term time perspective is expected to incentivise cooperation 
especially for proselfs whilst prosocials should generally exhibit a higher level of cooperation 
(H4), regardless of time perspective (Van Lange et al., 2011).  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and thirteen undergraduate psychology students from a UK university 
(mean age 20.3, SD = 5.4, 3 missing), 96 of them women, completed the on-line experiment. 
The experiment lasted approximately 25 min, and participants were compensated with credits 
for fulfilling study requirements.  
Task and Procedure 
The experimental task was a student work group scenario adapted from Moser and 
Wodzicki (2007) and was to imagine working in pairs on a compulsory course project 
involving literature research, writing a term paper and making a presentation in class. 
Collaboration time was manipulated between subjects: in the one week condition (short-
term), participants were instructed that it was already towards the end of the academic term, 
that they only had one week to complete the assignment and that there would be no further 
group work in the following term. In the two academic terms (long-term) condition, 
participants were told that they had the entire term to complete the assignment and that they 
would again work together on a subsequent project with the same partner in the following 
term. The students were enrolled in different programmes with both shared and separate 
modules, so that both the long- and short-term conditions were realistic in their study context. 
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After the general introduction to the on-line experiment and the consent form and 
prior to the experimental manipulations, participants’ social value orientations were assessed. 
Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions and 
read the respective scenario texts informing them of a short-term or long-term collaboration, 
respectively. Subsequently, they answered the manipulation check and the preferred working 
style items. Then, participants were confronted with scenario descriptions of defective, help-
seeking or cooperative behaviour of their partner across different task contexts and asked for 
their reactions (see below), which were used as dependent variables. Additional items 
measured importance of outcome and past work group experience.  
Manipulation Checks  
The manipulation check consisted of two items: “The group assignment comprises 
only one week. There will be no further group work” (short-term) and “The group assignment 
comprises one term. I will work together with my partner again on another group project next 
term” (long-term). 87 participants completed and correctly answered the manipulation check 
and were included in the analyses. 
Measures 
 Preferred working style. This aimed to assess participants’ general preference before 
being influenced by scenarios of their partner’s behaviour. It consisted of two items: “I prefer 
to work alone on both the presentation and the paper” (non-cooperative) and “I prefer to work 
jointly with the other student on both, the presentation and the paper” (cooperative).  
 Cooperation scenarios. Subsequently, participants read short descriptions of specific 
situations in which the partner either showed defective, cooperative or help-seeking 
behaviour:  
Defection of partner: You have decided that each of you will summarise one of the 
articles until the end of the week (long-term) / until the next day (short-term). However, you 
receive no summary from your partner. What do you do? 
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Help-seeking of partner: Your partner asks you for help because she/he had 
difficulties with a text. You would have to familiarise yourself with the text, which is 
different from your own sub-topic. This would take up valuable time, which you need for 
your own work. What do you do? 
Cooperation of partner: Your partner starts forwarding you many articles that are 
relevant for your sub-topic. How do you react? 
Cooperation intention items.  The different reactions used a six-point scale (1 
strongly disagree to 6 strongly agree) and consisted of the following options: 
Equality norm: I would insist that he / she writes the summary.  
Conditional defection: I would reduce my effort as well.  
Compensation: I would increase my efforts in order to compensate for his / her lack 
of effort. 
Conditional cooperation: I would only get involved as far as I can benefit from the 
collaboration for my own sub-topic and my part of the presentation.  
Disengagement: I would concentrate working on my part of the presentation so that 
at least my part is of high quality.  
Full cooperation: I would do the same with my articles.  
Full defection: I would ignore the articles and search for articles on my own.  
Helping: I would take the time to familiarise myself with the text, but only go through 
the most important problems, so to lose not too much time.   
Social value orientation. Social value orientation was assessed with the Decomposed 
Game Measure (DGM;Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten & Joireman, 1997). The DGM consists of 
nine items, each containing three pairs of outcome distributions for oneself and an unknown 
other, and each representing a particular orientation (prosocial or proself). Respondents are 
required to select one of the three pairs for each item. When respondents choose at least six 
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pairs with the same outcome distributions, they are classified accordingly. If less than six 
choices are made for one distribution, the participant remains unclassified. 
Regarding SVO, 45 could be classified as prosocials, 16 as proselfs, and 26 could not 
be classified which resulted in a final sample of 61 participants (with n = 15 prosocials and 8 
proselfs in the short-term condition, and n = 30 prosocials and 8 proselfs in the long-term 
condition). Strength of relationships between variables did not change significantly when the 
original sample was reduced to 61 participants. 
 Past work group experience.  This was measured with two items after the scenario 
task was completed (e.g., “Until now, I had rather positive experiences with group work.”), 
using the mean value.  
Importance of outcome. The importance of outcome (Gärling, 1999; Shamir, 1990) 
was assessed with one item: “In the described case, a good or very good mark would be very 
important to me.”  
All items used a six-point scale (from 1 I strongly disagree to 6 I strongly agree). 
Inter-correlations between all measures are shown in Table 1.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Results 
First, distributions of preferred working style, SVO, past group experiences, and 
importance of outcome for both experimental groups were checked across conditions. 39 out 
of 61 participants (63.9%) preferred working jointly with the partner, with no difference 
between the two time conditions, χ2(1, n = 61) = .03, p = .87, odds ratio = 0.92. Also no 
significant differences were found for SVO (15 of 23 participants in the short-term and 30 of 
38 participants in the long-term condition were classified as prosocial , χ2(1, n = 61) = 1.40, p 
= .24, odds ratio = 0.50), for past group experiences (M = 4.05, SD = 1.22, t(44) = 0.71, p = 
.48, d = 0.22), and for importance of outcome (M = 5.54, SD = .54, t(59) = 0.71, p = .48, d = 
0.19) between conditions. 
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Overall, average ratings indicated rather positive past group experiences, a high 
importance of outcome, a preference for working jointly and a ratio of approximately two 
thirds to one third for prosocials to proselfs, which is in line with previous research (Van 
Lange et al., 2011). With no significant differences between the two experimental time 
conditions for these control variables all further results below can be interpreted as effects of 
long- vs. short-term collaboration times. 
Analyses of Variance of Collaboration Time and Cooperation Intentions 
 To test for the effect of collaboration time on cooperation intentions, a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed with equality norm, conditional 
cooperation, disengagement, conditional defection, compensation, helping, full cooperation 
and full defection as dependent variables (for mean values see Figure 1). The MANOVA 
showed an overall significant effect of collaboration time across all cooperation intentions, 
Wilks’  =.74, F(8, 52) = 2.28, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .26. Further univariate tests are presented 
separately below. 
 (Insert Figure 1 about here) 
Partner defects.  Confirming hypothesis H1a, participants insisted more on equal 
contributions from the partner for literature summaries in the long-term compared to the 
short-term condition (t(59) = -2.02, p = .05, d = 0.51; equality norm). When the partner 
defected in preparing for the class presentation, participants in both conditions were still 
willing to employ a conditional cooperation strategy, t(59) = 0.72, p = .48, d = 0.19 
(conditional cooperation). Similarly, the partner’s defection when preparing the term paper 
led to participants compensating for this in both conditions, t(59) = 1.03, p = .31, d = 0.27 
(compensation). Lastly, participants in both conditions were equally likely to disengage from 
a defecting partner (but not the project), t(59) = -0.67, p = .51, d = 0.40 (disengagement), but 
did not defect themselves, t(59) = -1.17, p = .25, d = 0.33. This seems to reflect the overall 
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importance of marks regardless of collaboration time and the preference for working 
collaboratively, and only partly confirms hypothesis H1b. 
Partner seeks help. Fully consistent with H2, participants were more likely to help 
their partner in the short-term than in the long-term, t(59) = 3.58, p = .001, d = 0.98 (helping).  
Partner is cooperative. Overall, participants were highly likely to reciprocate with 
full cooperation. Contradictory to H3, participants were more likely to fully reciprocate by 
also sending articles to the partner and less prone to withdraw in the short term than the long-
term collaboration (full cooperation: t(59) = 2.62, p = .01, d = 0.73; full defection: t(59) = -
2.25, p = .03, d = 0.61). 
Preferred Working Style, Past Work Group Experience and Importance of Outcome 
Additional MANOVAS with work style preference, past group work experience and 
the importance of outcome as covariates showed no significant results for any of the three 
controls (past work group experience, Wilks’  = .82, F(8, 34) = 0.95, p = .49, ηp
2 
= .18; 
preferred working style, Wilks’  = .75, F(8, 34) = 1.43, p = .22, ηp
2 
= .25; importance of 
outcome, Wilks’  = .78, F(8, 34) = 1.17, p = .34, ηp
2 
= .22). However, univariate analyses 
revealed that for conditional cooperation past group experience was a significant covariate, 
F(1, 41) = 8.64, p = .01, ηp
2 
= .17, and the importance of outcome was a significant covariate 
for full defection, F(1, 41) = 5.99, p = .02, ηp
2 
= .13. As shown in Table 1, preference for 
working collaboratively correlated negatively with conditional cooperation (r = -.36, p = .01) 
and full defection (r = -.27, p = .03), and positively with past experiences of group work (r = 
.39, p = .01). This was the only significant correlation of past work group experiences with 
any of the other variables. There was no significant correlation with importance of outcome 
with any variables. 
Social Value Orientation 
There was no significant interaction between collaboration time and SVO, Wilks’  = 
.90, F(8, 50) = .71, p = .69, ηp
2 
= .10, but there was a main effect of SVO on overall 
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cooperation intentions, Wilks’  =.76, F(8, 50) = 1.99, p = .07, ηp
2 
= .24. Participants were 
generally very cooperative with very low ratings for full defection (Mtotal = 1.69, SD = 0.87), 
and with relatively lower ratings by prosocials (M = 1.58, SD = 0.78) than by proselfs (M = 
2.00, SD = 1.03), F(1, 57) = 3.44, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .06. Further univariate tests revealed that, 
consistent with their preference for equal outcomes, prosocials insisted more on equality 
norms when the partner defected than proselfs, F(1, 57) = 6.50, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .08, and were 
more willing to cooperate fully when the partner cooperated, F(1, 57) = 3.22, p = .08, ηp
2
 = 
.05. They did not, however, differ in their support for a help-seeking partner, F(1, 57) = 0.01, 
p = .93, ηp
2
 = .00, thus confirming the higher level of cooperation for prosocials (H4), 
regardless of collaboration time. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
Discussion 
Time fundamentally shapes our lives and influences how we perceive others and 
interact with them. This paper addresses the still under-researched influence of anticipated 
collaboration time in information-sharing dilemmas. Sharing information is central for 
organizational success in a knowledge-intensive work environment but often fails because of 
motivational obstacles. One such obstacle may be the differently perceived costs and benefits 
of information-sharing depending on the length of collaboration time. 
The current study addressed gaps in previous research in several respects: (1) by using 
an information-sharing task that participants had prior experience with to map it more closely 
to real world experiences; (2) by including dilemma scenarios such as help-seeking with 
especially high costs for the co-operator and typical of everyday work situations; (3) by using 
collaboration times similar to real work settings (one week vs. two academic terms); and (4) 
by using an information-sharing dilemma instead of a dilemma game with monetary or token 
contributions to reflect the importance of information in today’s knowledge-intensive work 
places. 
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Overall, participants tended to focus more on the immediate task outcome in the short-
term and more on equality in the exchange relationship in the long-term. The greater 
preference for insisting on equality in a long-term collaboration can be interpreted as an aim 
to set a norm of reciprocity early on in the relationship to avoid exploitation in the future. 
Accepting uneven contributions or even defection of the partner in a long-term collaboration 
would signal that is it acceptable to “play the sucker” in the exchange relationship with 
potentially very high costs in the future. Consistent with this finding, participants were 
significantly more willing to put up with a defecting partner and to contribute more to get the 
task done when the collaboration time was short, which can be interpreted as a direct effect of 
anticipated collaboration time. If the collaboration is over after one week, the potential 
exploitation is very limited, but there is also not much time to reward cooperation or punish 
defection. Hence, establishing norms of reciprocity is not an effective strategy in short-term 
collaboration, where there is very limited time to get the job done and achieve the desired 
outcome. This seems to lead to a much greater focus on the task and less focus on 
relationship management, which is also consistent with results found in a study on time and 
creativity in teams (Bakker et al, 2013) and has been postulated in a theoretical paper on 
collaboration in temporary virtual teams (Saunders & Ahuja, 2006). 
A scenario of specific interest is the social dilemma of helping a less experienced 
partner because the costs of cooperation for the supporting partner are very high. The helping 
dilemma is of great practical importance for team management because real teams need that 
type of support between team members with different skills and abilities to be able to be 
productive. Interestingly, the opposite effect to the overall tendencies above could be found 
for helping behaviour. Participants were less willing to help a partner in a long-term 
collaboration, probably because of the high costs of helping an inexperienced partner long-
term. Consistent with this, helping increased in a short-term collaboration, presumably 
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because the investment was limited and getting the task done was more important than the 
costs of helping just once. 
A rather unexpected and task specific finding was that participants were less likely to 
share literature in a long-term than a short-term collaboration. Somewhat counter-intuitively, 
participants rather chose to rely on themselves for the literature search and review in the 
long-term condition but not in the short term collaboration. It can only be speculated at this 
stage that this might have to do with a lack of trust in the academic competence of the 
cooperation partner due to an order effect in the study design. In the scenario section 
immediately pre-ceding the question about sharing literature search and reviews was the 
helping scenario portraying the partner as inexperienced. While this is probably an 
unintended effect of the study design, it further confirms the effect of collaboration time on 
information-sharing. In the long-term, participants chose to not rely on the (presumably 
incompetent) partner as there was time to do it themselves. In contrast, in the one week 
condition they accepted all the help they could get even from an inexperienced partner. 
Moreover, social value orientations also play a role: For instance, proselfs defected 
more often as a reaction to a defecting partner, thus showing tit-for-tat behaviour, but only if 
the partner did not contribute to writing the term paper, but not if the task was to prepare the 
presentation. Proselfs seemed to react more strongly if costs were high (writing a paper is 
more costly than passing on literature) or if they ran the risk of being seen as incompetent in 
public, for example when giving a presentation in class. In contrast, prosocials were more 
concerned with establishing an equality norm if the partner defected and more willing to 
reciprocate if the partner was cooperative. This confirms recent research showing that 
prosocials not only prefer joint positive outcomes, but also equality in contributions (Van 
Lange et al., 2013). There was however, no interaction of SVO with collaboration time. One 
reason may lay in the use of an information-sharing dilemma rather than a monetary dilemma 
as in a previous study (Van Lange et al., 2011) and that the influence of SVO could be 
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dilemma-specific, something which was also found when comparing step-level and 
continuous public good games (Abele et al., 2010). 
Limitations  
 Using a scenario design with a work group task that students generally have 
experience with has both advantages and disadvantages. An advantage is the higher 
ecological validity of such a scenario compared to dilemma games in the lab. A potential 
disadvantage is that related experiences in the real world might shape the answers in the 
scenario independently of the experimental conditions and thus weaken the effect of 
experimental manipulations. To get a measure of how strong those influences might be, 
preferred working style, previous experiences with group work and the importance of 
receiving a good grade were included as control variables. At least in this study, none of the 
variables above was a significant covariate which strengthens the argument that the 
differences in cooperation intentions can be attributed to collaboration time.  
The results should be generalizable for student workgroups on the basis that it was a 
typical student task and participants were not asked to imagine doing tasks they had no prior 
experience with. However, transferability of the results to teams more generally is clearly 
limited, namely because important aspects of real work environments, for example work 
experience and perception of the work environment (such as work climate, superiors, 
colleagues, job security), are difficult to measure and to model adequately in an experimental 
setting.  
Lastly, using a scenario approach has the disadvantage of only studying cooperation 
intentions and not actual behaviour. However, in this case the mere anticipation of 
collaboration time is actually very important because the attitude towards the partner and the 
motivation to collaborate is highly influenced by the knowledge about future collaboration 
and likely will shape subsequent behaviour in the present (Rabinovich et al., 2010).  
Implications for Practice and Research 
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The findings have practical implications for team management and contribute to 
understanding why it can be difficult to implement knowledge management systems and to 
motivate employees to share information (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002). Knowledge-sharing and 
developing a “culture of reciprocity” in an organisation both require a longer-term 
perspective, which employees often don’t have in economically unstable times with little job 
security. A few studies already point in that direction, for example, Koster, Sanders, and 
Emmerik (2003) found a decline of organizational citizenship behaviour in last-year PhD 
students, and Heide and Miner (1992) state that, “observers of industrial relations in the 
United States, for example, have suggested that both firms and unions are much more likely 
to adopt cooperative strategies when they assume they are likely to interact for an 
indeterminate future (…)” (p. 268). One implication of the present study is that organisations 
should give more consideration to the time frames of their knowledge management strategies 
as longer-term rewards will help to ensure and improve employee cooperation (Tsui, Pearce, 
Porter, & Triploi, 1997). With regard to future research the findings show the importance of 
social dilemma paradigms that use information instead of monetary contributions and include 
behaviours such as helping and disengagement which are central for the functioning of real 
teams.  
In conclusion, the fact that it was possible to find effects of collaboration time even in 
an overall highly cooperative student sample confirms the importance of time for work 
relationships in general and for information-sharing dilemmas in particular. It shows how 
sensibly people react to the different costs and benefits of short vs. long-time collaboration 
dilemmas and how the ‘shadow of the future’ shapes their attitudes and intentions in the 
present.  
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Table 1 
Inter-correlations of all measures included (N=61). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
(1)  Collaboration Time -             
(2)  Equality norm .25* -            
(3)  Conditional defection -.09 -.06 -           
(4)  Disengagement .09 .23 .42** -          
(5)  Conditional cooperation .15 -.03 .23 .01          
(6)  Compensation -.13 -.25 .19 -.10 -.12 -        
(7)  Helping -.42** -.32* .08 -.08 -.10 .17 -       
(8)  Full cooperation -.32* -.19 -.03 -.02 -.16 -.01 .30* -      
(9)  Full defection .28* .35** .13 .23 .08 -.24 -.48** -.28* -     
(10) SVO  .15 .14 -.12 -.28* .22 -.10 .04 .16 .08 -    
(11) Group work experience -.11 .02 -.05 -11 -.05 -.20 .23 .00 .04 .19 -   
(12) Importance of outcome .09 .14 .04 .16 -.24 .09 -.17 .13 -.07 .19 .11 -  
(13) Working style preference -.21 .03 -.36** -.20 -.27* -.05 .14 -.07 -.04 -.06 .39** .19 - 
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Note. Correlations are based on the final sample. Collaboration time: -1 short-term, 1 long-term; working style preference: 0 non-cooperative, 1 
cooperative; SVO: 0 proself, 1 prosocial; all cooperation items were assessed on a six-point scale (1 strongly disagree to 6 strongly agree). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Mean values of the eight dependent variables in the two time conditions, showing 
the main effect of collaboration time on cooperation intentions. Scale ranged from 1 strongly 
disagree to 6 strongly agree.  
Note. Low values of full defection indicate a low level of agreement with the intention to fully 
defect. 
 
Figure 2. Mean values of the eight dependent variables for proselfs and prosocials, showing 
the main effect of social value orientation on cooperation intentions. Scale ranged from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  
Note. Low values of full defection indicate a low level of agreement with the intention to 
defect fully. 
  
 
